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Indications of fraud in the June 12 Iranian presidential election, together with large-scale street 
demonstrations, have led to claims that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not actually win the election, and that 
the majority of Iranians perceive their government as illegitimate and favor regime change.  
An analysis of multiple polls of the Iranian public from three different sources finds little evidence to 
support such conclusions.  
The analysis conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland 
(PIPA), was based on: 
•  a series of 10 recently-released polls conducted by the University of Tehran; eight conducted in the 
month before the June 12 election and two conducted in the month after the election, based on telephone 
interviews conducted within Iran  
•  a poll by GlobeScan conducted shortly after the election, based on telephone interviews conducted 
within Iran  
•  a poll by WorldPublicOpinion.org (managed by PIPA) conducted August 27--September 10, based on 
telephone interviews made by calling into Iran  
The study sought to address the widely-discussed 
hypotheses that Ahmadinejad did not win the June 
12 election and that the Iranian people perceive 
their government as illegitimate. It also sought to 
explore the assumption that the opposition 
represents a movement favoring a substantially 
different posture toward the United States. The 
analysis of the data found little evidence to 
support any of these hypotheses.  
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Steven Kull, director of PIPA, said, "Our analysis 
suggests that it would not be prudent to base US 
policy on the assumption that the Iranian public is 
in a pre-revolutionary state of mind." 
On the question of whether Ahmadinejad won the 
June 12 election, in the week before the election 
and after the election, in all polls a majority said they planned to or did vote for Ahmadinejad. These 
numbers ranged from 52 to 57% immediately 
election.  
Steven Kull comments, "These findings do not 
prove that there were no irregularities in 
 
that a majority rejected Ahmadinejad."  
The analysis did reveal factors that could have 
contributed to the impression that Ahmadine
did not win. University of Tehran polls show 
the first few weeks of the campaign his support 
dropped precipitously and he did not enjoy majority support in the city of Tehran. But in the week before 
the election, his support recovered outside the capital.  
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many levels are so similar, whether the data was collected inside Iran or by calling into Iran, 
that it is hard to conclude that these data were fabricated."  
e, on some questions majorities expressed views that were less 




Ahmadinejad is the legitimate president and affirm the Islamist nature of the regime.  
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negative in their views of the US government and were strongly committed to Iran's nuclear program.  
 
in exchange for the removal of sanctions. However, this was equally true of the majority of all Iranians.  
Going into the election 57% said they expected Ahmadinejad to win. Thus it is not surprising that, in 
several post-election polls, more than seven in ten said
fair.  
The polls did reveal some reservations about the 
government. Less than a majority expressed full 
confidence in the Guardian Council (42%) and th
Ministry of the Interior (38%). While over eight in 
ten said they were satisfied with the current 
system of government, in June les
this number dropped to 41% in July.  
However none of the polls found indications of 
support for regime change. Large majorities, 
including majorities of Mousavi supporters, 
endorse the Islamist character of the 
power to veto laws they see as contrary to sharia.  
To address the possibility that the data collected
within Iran may have been fabricated, PIPA 
compared the patterns of responses, includin
within subgroups, in data collected inside Iran to 
those collected by calling into Iran from the 
outside. Steven Kull comments, "The patterns of 
responses at 
Another concern is that Iranian respondents were not answering candidly out of fear of some type of 
reprisal for making statements in support of the opposition or critical of the regime, particularly in the 
post-election environment. As noted abov
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Still there was the fact that after the election, the numbers expressing support for Mousavi diminished 
suggests that some self-censoring may have been occurring. Thus PIPA put special emphasis on analyzing
the responses of those who felt bold enough to say that they voted for the opposition on the assumption 
that they would be frank on other issues as well. While Mousavi supporters are less affirmative o
legitimacy of the regime than the public as a whole, still a majority says that they belie
Some analysts have suggested that if the opposition were to gain power this would lead to fundamenta
changes in the Iranian posture toward the US. Focus
Mousavi, as an approximation of the opposition,  
PIPA found that a majority were ready to negotiate with the US on a number of issues, while the Irania
public as a whole was more divided. However, Mousavi supporters, like the general public, were quite 
A majority of Mousavi supporters did favor diplomatic relations with the US, and were ready to make a 
deal whereby Iran would preclude developing nuclear weapons through intrusive international inspections
 
